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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 98-5052 
 
EVELYN O. HOLLEY, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, HERSHEL GOBER, 
ACTING SECRETARY 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 97-cv-05484) 
District Judge: Hon. John W. Bissell 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 2, 1998 
 
Before: SLOVITER, ROTH and ROSENN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed January 21, 1999) 
 
 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Evelyn Holley, who filed a pro se complaint alleging 
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by her 
employer, the Department of Veteran Affairs, appeals from 
the District Court's sua sponte dismissal of her complaint. 
The case raises an issue of the effect of a motion for 
reconsideration filed by a federal employee with the EEOC 
on the time to file a court action.1  
 
I. 
 
Holley is a federal employee with the East Orange, New 
Jersey, Department of Veteran Affairs Medical Center 
("DVA"). During the past ten years, Holleyfiled several 
complaints with the EEOC, alleging that she was the 
subject of sex-based and retaliatory discrimination and 
harassment in the workplace. The four complaints relevant 
to this appeal were consolidated for investigation and 
proceedings at the agency level (Agency Nos. 92-2091, 93- 
2846, 93-3295, and 94-0085). In those complaints, Holley 
alleged that she was the subject of discrimination because: 
(1) in May 1993, she was not selected for the VAFY-94 
Associate Director Training Program; (2) in May, 1993, she 
was excluded from the JCAHO Leadership Interview 
Meeting; (3) in February, 1993, she was required to make 
changes in the Medical Center Policy Memorandum 
concerning the Patient Representative Program; (4) for the 
period April 1, 1992, through March 31, 1993, she was not 
rated outstanding; (5) as a form of sexual harassment, she 
received an admonishment on September 16, 1993; (6) her 
position and occupational title code were changed effective 
December 24, 1991; (7) she was reassigned on April 2, 
1992, and (8) she was subjected to a hostile environment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This matter is submitted on appellant's brief only. The Office of the 
United States Attorney initially entered an appearance on behalf of the 
appellee, but then withdrew its appearance beforefiling a brief. 
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including being excluded from meetings on March 11 and 
13, 1992.2 
 
The DVA adopted the findings of an EEOC administrative 
law judge who determined that there was insufficient 
evidence of discrimination to support the claims in Holley's 
complaints. Holley received notice of the DVA's final 
decision on November 24, 1994. Holley filed an appeal to 
the EEOC, which dismissed her appeal with respect to all 
four complaints as untimely filed (Appeal No. 01952467). 
Holley received notice of the EEOC's dismissal, as well as 
notice of her "right to sue" in federal court, on July 21, 
1995. On July 28, 1995, Holley filed a request with the 
EEOC for reconsideration of its dismissal of the appeal. 
 
On November 10, 1997, before the EEOC ruled on her 
pending request for reconsideration, Holley commenced this 
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. S 2000e-16, by filing a pro se complaint in the 
district court. Holley attached to her complaint a copy of 
the EEOC's decision dismissing her appeals as untimely 
filed. On November 13, 1997, three days after Holley filed 
her complaint in the district court, the EEOC issued a 
decision granting in part Holley's request for 
reconsideration. The EEOC found that, although three of 
her appeals were properly dismissed as untimelyfiled, her 
appeal with respect to the decision in Agency No. 92-2091 
was timely. The EEOC ruled upon the merits of that appeal 
on reconsideration, and decided adversely to Holley. 
 
By order entered December 29, 1997, before service of 
Holley's complaint upon the defendant, the District Court 
dismissed the complaint sua sponte as time-barred. The 
court noted that a Title VII action must be commenced 
within 90 days of the date on which the plaintiff received 
notice that the EEOC dismissed the appeal. The court 
found that "plaintiff filed the present action approximately 
27 months after receipt of the EEOC's decision and Notice 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Holley's complaints are not part of the record on appeal, and this 
recitation of the issues that she presented was gleaned from other 
documents in the record. It is unclear on the present record whether 
additional claims were presented in the complaints at issue. 
 
                                3 
  
of Right to Sue. Her Complaint is long time-barred and 
must be dismissed." 
 
Holley timely filed this appeal. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review is plenary. See 
Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020-22 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
II. 
 
The District Court made no mention of, and failed to 
consider, the effect that Holley's timely filed request for 
EEOC reconsideration had upon her time for filing her 
court action. Under the EEOC's regulations, a federal 
employee may file a civil action in federal court (1) within 
90 days of receipt of the EEOC's "final decision" on the 
appeal, or (2) after 180 days from the date of filing an 
appeal with the EEOC if, at that time, the EEOC has yet to 
issue a "final decision." See 29 C.F.R. S 1614.408(c) & (d). 
A party to a federal employee's EEOC appeal has the right 
to file a request for reconsideration within 30 days of 
receipt of the EEOC's decision. See 29 C.F.R. S 1614.407(a). 
 
When a reconsideration request is timely filed, the 
EEOC's decision on appeal becomes "final" only when that 
request is granted or denied. See 29 C.F.R.S 1614.405(b)(1) 
(providing that an EEOC decision on appeal is final unless 
"either party files a timely request for reconsideration 
pursuant to S 1614.407"); Robbins v. Bentsen, 41 F.3d 
1195, 1198 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Decisions issued on[EEOC] 
appeals are considered `final decisions' within the meaning 
of S 1614.408 unless there is a motion for 
reconsideration."); Briggs v. Henderson, 11 F. Supp. 2d 727 
(D. Conn. 1998) ("The Postal Service's request for 
reconsideration of the EEOC Decision, however, rendered 
the EEOC's action nonfinal."); Metsopulos v. Runyon, 918 F. 
Supp. 851, 861 (D.N.J. 1996) ("where reargument is timely 
requested, finality occurs when the request for 
reconsideration is granted or denied"). 
 
Thus, a straightforward reading of the applicable 
regulations leads to the conclusion that a federal 
employee's timely filed request for reconsideration tolls the 
90-day deadline for filing suit in federal court. This 
conclusion accords with the holdings of the other courts of 
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appeals that have addressed the issue. See Belhomme v. 
Widnall, 127 F.3d 1214, 1216-17 (10th Cir. 1997) ("This 
circuit has held that a timely petition for reconsideration 
will toll the filing deadline for a suit in district court, but an 
untimely petition will have no tolling effect."); Rowe v. 
Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 190 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The filing of a 
timely request to reopen an EEOC decision tolls the 
statutory time limit."); Donaldson v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 
759 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); Nordell v. Heckler, 749 
F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same). 
 
In its opinion in Metsopulos, the District Court noted that 
before the EEOC adopted the 1992 regulation, 29 C.F.R. 
S 1614.405(b)(1), the circuits had split on the question 
whether a request for reconsideration of an EEOC decision 
rendered the first decision non-final. See 918 F. Supp. at 
861 n.5. With the 1992 regulation, the EEOC opted to 
follow the rule of the Sixth and D.C. Circuits in Donaldson 
and Nordell, and to reject that of the Ninth and Fourth 
Circuits in Mahroom v. Defense Language Institute, 732 
F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1984)(denial of appeal by EEOC 
was final decision "unaltered by a request for 
reconsideration"), and Birch v. Lehman, 677 F.2d 1006 (4th 
Cir. 1982)(same). The latter two cases were decided before 
the promulgation of the new regulation. See Williams v. 
Brown, 1997 WL 88376, at * 2 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 18, 1997) 
("[T]he Ninth Circuit's decision in Mahroom has been called 
into question by the EEOC's adoption of 29 C.F.R. 
S 1614.405(b)(1) in 1992."). 
 
Holley's complaint alleges, and the record reflects, that 
her request for reconsideration was timely filed, as it was 
within 30 days of her receipt of the EEOC's decision 
dismissing her appeal. Consequently, the 90-day limitations 
period on the filing of her suit in the district court was 
tolled. Belhomme, 127 F.3d at 1216-17; Rowe, 967 F.2d at 
190. When Holley filed her complaint in the district court 
on November 10, 1997, the EEOC had yet to render a "final 
decision" on her appeal as her request for reconsideration 
was still pending. See 29 C.F.R. S 1614.405(b)(1) (decision 
on appeal is not "final" if party files timely request for 
reconsideration). Because she filed her complaint more 
than 180 days after the date on which she filed her appeal 
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with the EEOC, and because she filed suit before the EEOC 
rendered its "final decision" by ruling on her 
reconsideration request, her complaint was timelyfiled. 
 
Our decision in McCray v. Corry Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 224 
(3d Cir. 1995), does not compel a contrary decision. In 
McCray, the issue presented was whether a timely request 
for EEOC reconsideration filed by a private-sector employee 
tolled her time to file an ADEA complaint in the district 
court. We held that it did not. Id. at 229 ("[W]e hold that 
merely requesting reconsideration of an EEOC 
Determination does not toll the ninety day statute of 
limitations controlling the filing of a civil action."). We noted 
that there is no federal regulation governing a private-sector 
employee's request for EEOC reconsideration of an ADEA 
claim. See id. at 228. Accordingly, we focused on 29 C.F.R. 
S 1601.19(b), the regulation governing EEOC 
reconsideration of a "no cause" determination in Title VII 
and ADA cases filed by private-sector employees. For 
private-sector employees, a timely request for 
reconsideration only serves to toll the time tofile a Title VII 
or ADA suit in federal court if "the EEOC issues notice of 
its intent to reconsider within ninety days of the claimant's 
receipt of a no cause determination, the claimant has not 
filed suit yet and the claimant did not request and receive 
a notice of right to sue." Id. at 229. 
 
Significantly, in McCray we did not consider the import of 
a federal employee's timely request for reconsideration, 
which is governed by a different set of federal regulations. 
Holley is a federal employee, and, as we explained above, 
under the regulations that govern suits by federal 
employees, her timely request for reconsideration tolled the 
90-day period for filing suit in the district court.3 
 
The fact that the EEOC granted in part Holley's request 
for reconsideration three days after she filed this action in 
the district court does not change the result. By the time 
the EEOC found that her appeal with respect to one of her 
four underlying complaints should not have been dismissed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note the difference in treatment in this connection between the 
regulations applicable to federal employees and those applicable to 
private sector claimants, but that is an issue for Congress or the EEOC. 
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as untimely filed, and ruled against her on the merits of 
that appeal, Holley's complaint had been timely filed. 
 
In fact, under the regulations, once Holley filed her action 
the EEOC lost any authority to consider her request for 
reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. S 1614.410 ([f]iling a civil 
action . . . shall terminate Commission processing of the 
appeal). Accordingly, the EEOC's subsequent ruling on 
Holley's reconsideration request had no effect. See Briggs, 
11 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (finding that, under S 1614.410, "the 
filing of this civil action terminated the processing of 
plaintiff's appeal (including the . . . request for 
reconsideration)").4 
 
We note that Holley's complaint invoked 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-5, the provision that applies generally to private- 
sector employers, under which her suit would be untimely, 
rather than S 2000e-16, the provision applicable to 
discrimination claims by federal employees. Because Holley 
is pursuing her action pro se, we have an obligation to read 
her pleadings liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 
520-21 (1972). We apply the applicable law, irrespective of 
whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name. See 
Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1996); Lewis v. 
Attorney General of United States, 878 F.2d 714, 722 n.20 
(3d Cir. 1989). This is particularly true where, as here, the 
statutory citation appears in the preprinted portion of a 
form for discrimination complaints that appears to have 
been supplied by the Clerk of the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey. The substance of Holley's complaint 
is that her employer, a federal agency, engaged in 
discrimination. Accordingly, her complaint should be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It has come to our attention that on July 16, 1998 this court issued 
a per curiam Opinion in No. 98-5051, affirming the District Court's 
dismissal of a different Title VII complaint that Holley had filed. The 
procedural facts there were indistinguishable from those in the present 
case, as the District Court had dismissed Holley's complaint sua sponte 
as untimely filed despite the fact that Holley noted in her complaint that 
she had filed a timely request for reconsideration with the EEOC. If 
Holley wishes to pursue those claims, she may file a motion to recall the 
mandate in 98-5051, which issued on September 9, 1998, within 60 
days from the filing of this opinion. 
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governed by the rules pertaining to discrimination claims 
by federal employees. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be reversed and the case remanded for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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